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Informed Consent in Washington
INFORMED CONSENT IN WASHINGTON:
EXPANDED SCOPE OF
MATERIAL FACTS THAT THE
PHYSICIAN MUST DISCLOSE TO HIS PATIENT
The doctrine of informed consent allows a patient to recover damages
from a physician despite having received non-negligent medical diagnosis
and treatment. I The frequent justification for the recovery is that a patient
has the right to decide what is done to his body. Failing to obtain a pa-
tient's informed consent to a particular course of treatment makes a physi-
cian liable for injuries proximately resulting from that treatment. In
Washington, the doctrine has grown swiftly2 and has been heavily influ-
enced by cases from other jurisdictions. 3 Although the doctrine's skeletal
elements have been enacted into statute, 4 it remains the task of develop-
1. Holt v. Nelson, I 1 Wn. App. 230,237,523 P.2d 211,216-17 (1974).
2. A cause of action based on an informed consent theory was not recognized in Washington
until 1970. Watkins v. Parpala, 2 Wn. App. 484,490-91,469 P.2d 974, 978 (1970).
3. Three cases from other jurisdictions have been particularly influential in Washington's devel-
opment of the doctrine: Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Wilkinson v.
Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
4. R.C.W. § 7.70.050 (1979) provides:
(1) The following shall be necessary elements of proof that injury resulted from health care in
a civil negligence case or arbitration involving the issue of the alleged breach of the duty to
secure an informed consent by a patient or his representatives against a health care provider:
(a) That the health care provider failed to inform the patient of a material fact or facts relating
to the treatment;
(b) That the patient consented to the treatment without being aware of or fully informed of
such material fact or facts;
(c) That a reasonably prudent patient under similar circumstances would not have consented
to the treatment if informed of such material fact or facts;
(d) That the treatment in question proximately caused injury to the patient.
(2) Under the provisions of this section a fact is defined as or considered to be a material fact,
if a reasonably prudent person in the position of the patient or his representative would attach
significarfce to it deciding whether or not to submit to the proposed treatment.
(3) Material facts under the provisions of this section which must be established by expert
testimony shall be either:
(a) The nature and character of the treatment proposed and administered;
(b) The anticipated results of the treatment proposed and administered;
(c) The recognized possible alternative forms of treatment; or
(d) The recognized serious possible risks, complications, and anticipated benefits involved in
the treatment administered and in the recognized possible alternative forms of treatment, includ-
ing nontreatment.
(4) If a recognized health care emergency exists and the patient is not legally competent to
give an informed consent andlor a person legally authorized to consent on behalf of the patient is
not readily available, his consent to required treatment will be implied.
WAsH. REv. CODE § 7.70.050 (1979).
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ing case law to flesh out the rights, duties, powers, and liabilities 5 im-
posed by the informed consent legal relationship.
Part I of this comment charts the current contours of the doctrine 6 and
traces the general pro-plaintiff shift which has developed since Washing-
ton recognized the tort a decade ago. The model used to illustrate this
shift is a continuum, with the poles representing doctrinal and social pol-
icy choices favorable either to the plaintiff-patient or to the defendant-
physician. Part II examines the expanded scope of the physician's duty to
disclose material facts. This comment posits that the material facts which
the physician must disclose to his patient are the risks involved in a pro-
posed treatment, the alternatives to the proposed treatment, and any phys-
ical abnormalities discovered by the physician that may indicate danger to
the patient. Finally, Part III considers the medical and legal implications
occasioned by the pro-plaintiff shift of the doctrine and by the expanded
scope of required disclosure. Special emphasis is placed on the prospect
of recovering damages for a mistaken diagnosis under an informed con-
sent theory.
This comment concludes that the recent rapid expansion of the in-
formed consent doctrine threatens to upset the decisional balance between
patient and physician established by traditional malpractice law. The de-
cision whether that expansion is to be encouraged or discouraged should
rest on carefully considered policy choices, not the recent trend of ex-
ploiting the doctrine's malleability by characterizing traditional malprac-
tice claims in informed consent terms.
I. THE DOCTRINE GENERALLY
A. The Rationale
The physician's duty to refrain from treating the patient without first
obtaining the patient's informed consent is grounded upon the liberal pre-
cept, "Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sov-
ereign." 7 This principle of patient sovereignty conflicts with the basic
5. For definitions of rights, duties, powers, and liabilities, see Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terni-
nology, 29 YALE L.J. 163, 163-70 (1919). See also note II and accompanying text infra.
6. Injuries to the mental health of patients by psychologists or psychiatrists occasioned by the
failure to obtain the patient's informed consent to treatment are beyond the scope of this comment.
Likewise, this comment does not consider emergency situations or patients who lack the mental ca-
pacity to consent to treatment. R.C.W. § 7.70.050(4) (1979) provides for implied consent to treat-
ment in emergency situations. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050(4) (1979).
7. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 10 (A. Castell ed. 1947). An oft-cited alternative statement of the
principle was made by Justice Cardozo: "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body." Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Vol. 55:655, 1980
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tenet of the Hippocratic tradition, "Doctor knows best. ' 8 Patient sover-
eignty and physician sovereignty may be represented by poles of a contin-
uum to conceptualize the tension between the two principles. Neither pole
accurately represents the relation imposed by law. For example, the pros-
pect of patient recovery despite non-negligent medical decisions made by
the physician precludes the possibility that the physician possesses deci-
sional supremacy. Likewise, although opinions advert to the patient's
"right" to make the "ultimate informed decision,' ' 9 final authority does
not reside in the patient for two reasons. First, a patient cannot require a
physician to administer a course of treatment opposed by the physician. 10
Second, the patient is rarely in a position to propose treatment. He con-
sults a physician because he lacks ihe knowledge to diagnose or the abil-
ity to cure whatever malady has befallen him.
The term "informed consent" represents a complex legal relationship
and demands careful definition." Imposing a duty on the physician to
disclose information prior to treating the patient establishes a correlative
right of the patient to receive information material to the decision whether
to undergo that treatment. Incident to that patient right is the power either
to consent to or veto any proposed medical procedure. The physician is
under a legal liability because the legal relationship between the physician
and the patient depends on the patient's exercise of his power of choice.
Legal protection of the patient's right to receive information is
prompted by the unequal informational status of the parties. The physi-
cian's special training makes him aware of facts unlikely to be known by
the patient. Before the patient can exercise his power of choice in a mean-
ingful way, this disparity in information germane to the patient's exercise
Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1918), overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2
N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S. 3 (1957).
8. See Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 137, 148
(1977).
9. See Judge Callow's approving quotation of Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1,
10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972), in Millerv. Kennedy, 11 Wn. App. 272, 283,522 P.2d 852, 861
(1974), aff'dper curiam, 85 Wn. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975).
10. Individual sovereignty over mind and body also applies to the physician. For example, if a
cancer patient rejected a proposed surgical procedure in favor of laetrile treatments, the physician
would be under no duty to provide those treatments. Another example might involve a patient's
choice of acupuncture to combat pain.
1 . "The phrase 'informed consent' evokes . . . magic expectations. Its protagonists often
convey that once kissed by the doctrine, frog-patients will become autonomous princes .. "
Katz, supra note 8, at 137. The phrase requires painstaking definition before it can be discussed. Id.
at 138.
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of his power of choice must be minimized. Consequently, the duty to
supply information to the patient has been imposed on the physician. 12
Patient sovereignty, which represents the polar extreme of the sover-
eignty continuum, is often cited as the rationale behind informed consent.
This rationale is inaccurate, since analysis indicates that the patient does
not have the right 13 to decide what course his medical treatment will take.
The patient has the power to consent to or veto a proposed medical proce-
dure. The physician also has the power to refuse to administer a course of
treatment that he opposes. Thus, agreement between the physician and
the patient regarding the choice of medical procedure is a condition pre-
cedent to legally administered treatment.
B. The Affirmative Duty of the Physician to Disclose Information
In the past decade, a significant expansion of the physician's duty to
disclose information to his patient has occurred. As late as 1972 the phy-
sician's duty to disclose information was governed by the reasonable phy-
sician standard. 14 Recent cases, however, impose the duty to disclose as a
matter of law. 15 As a result, the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs to pro-
duce expert medical testimony has been eased. 16
The original doctrinal and social policy choice-whether the failure of
the physician to obtain his patient's informed consent embodied a bat-
tery' 7 or negligencel 8 theory-had largely been settled before Washing-
ton "imported" the doctrine. In Watkins v. Parpala, 19 the first Washing-
12. "The patient is entitled to rely upon the physician to tell him what he needs to know about
the condition of his own body." Miller v. Kennedy, II Wn. App. 272. 282, 522 P.2d 852. 860
(1974).
13. See note 5 supra.
14. ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wn. 2d 12, 29,499 P.2d 1, 11 (1972).
15. See, e.g., Miller v. Kennedy, I I Wn. App. 272, 290, 522 P.2d 852, 865 (1974).
16. Recalling the sovereignty continuum, the patient clearly would favor being relieved of the
requirement of producing expert medical testimony concerning the standards of disclosure in the
medical community. To the physician, disclosure was properly a question of medical judgment and
could not be evaluated in the absence of an expert standard. Disclosure as a matter of law relieves the
patient from the requirement of producing expert testimony regarding the standards of disclosure in
the medical community, circumventing any "conspiracy of silence" among medical colleagues.
R.C.W. § 7.70.050(3), however, lists facts that must be established by expert medical testimony in
an informed consent action. Although the patient's expert medical testimony burden has been eased.
procuring expert medical testimony generally remains mandatory for the plaintiff to recover WASH.
REV. Coos § 7.70.050(3) (1979).
17. An ineffective consent may be viewed as the equivalent of no consent at all; therefore, the
physician's treatment constitutes an unpermitted touching, or battery. See Berkey v. Anderson. I
Cal. App. 3d 790,803, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67, 76-77 (1969).
18. The duty to disclose may also be viewed as part of the physician's duty of due care. W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 165 (4th ed. 1971 ).
19. 2 Wn. App. 484,469 P.2d 974(1970).
658
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ton case to recognize informed consent, the appellate court was persuaded
to adopt the negligence framework primarily because of the unintentional
nature of the physician's actions. 20
The Watkins court also considered whether the physician's duty to ob-
tain a patient's informed consent existed as a matter of law or depended
upon the prevailing standards of the profession. 21 The court decided that
the physician's duty to obtain his patient's informed consent could be es-
tablished only by expert medical testimony regarding the medical com-
munity's standard of disclosure. 22
Judicial reluctance to impose a duty to disclose information absent ex-
pert medical testimony is evident in the first Washington Supreme Court
case to address the issue of informed consent, ZeBarth v. Swedish Hospi-
tal Medical Center.23 In ZeBarth, the court upheld a jury instruction re-
quiring physician disclosure defined in terms of what reasonable physi-
cians in the same specialty would divulge in similar circumstances. 24
When placed on the sovereignty continuum, both the Watkins and Ze-
Barth decisions represent doctrinal and social policy choices protecting
the defendant-physician. Absent an egregious physician mistake or com-
mon knowledge of the medical procedure, the patient could not recover
damages unless expert testimony established that the physician deviated
from accepted medical standards. 25
The current position, more favorable to the plaintiff-patient, was estab-
lished in Miller v. Kennedy. 26 At issue was the validity of the trial court's
instruction on informed consent. Precisely, plaintiff claimed that the in-
struction erroneously required him to establish that the defendant's con-
20. Id. at 490-91,469 P.2d at 978.
21. The issue before the court concerned the evidentiary requirements necessary to establish that
a particular risk should have been disclosed to the patient. In Watkins, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant-dentist caused gum impression material to enter an air passage from the root canal to the
sinus. After a jury verdict for defendant, the trial court granted plaintiff a new trial limited to dam-
ages. On appeal, the Watkins court held that an informed consent theory could not support the grant
of a new trial limited to damages and reinstated the jury verdict for defendant-dentist. Id. at 492, 469
P.2d at 979.
22. "[W]hether or not a particular risk should be disclosed should have the same evidentiary
requirements as any other act of malpractice." Id.
23. 81 Wn. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972). The injury to the plaintiff was paralysis allegedly caused
by an excessive initial dose of radiation received while undergoing treatment for Hodgkin's disease.
Id. at 16,499 P.2d at 5.
24. "This duty [to disclose], however, is limited to those disclosures which, according to the
recognized medical standards of that specialty, should be given by a reasonable doctor . . . in the
same or similar circumstances." Id. at 22-23 n.4, 499 P.2d at 8 n.4.
25. The ZeBarth court recognized that situations requiring departure from the general rule of
expert testimony would arise. See id. at 23-24, 499 P.2d at 8-9.
26. 11 Wn. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 85 Wn. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334
(1975). The injury to plaintiff was the loss of a kidney as a result of the insertion of a biopsy needle at
a point above the intended site. Id. at 274-75, 522 P.2d at 856.
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duct violated the medical community's standard of disclosure. 27 The
court of appeals stated that a standard established by physicians was irre-
concilable with the patient's "right" to make the "ultimate informed de-
cision." 28 Accordingly, the court held the instruction deficient for failing
to indicate that the duty to disclose material facts existed as a matter of
law. 29 The court reasoned that once expert testimony established that the
medical procedure undertaken presented a risk to the patient, then it was
no longer for medical custom to determine what information the physi-
cian should disclose. 30 The Washington Supreme Court affirmed Miller
in a per curiam opinion that explicitly adopted both the reasoning and the
result reached by the court of appeals. 31
Current Washington doctrine, that the physician's duty of disclosure
exists as a matter of law, is more favorable to the plaintiff-patient than
earlier doctrine. The accompanying social policy choice, protecting the
patient's power to consent to or veto a proposed medical procedure, is
also patient-oriented. On the issue of the duty to disclose, therefore, the
law has taken two pro-plaintiff steps. The first was recognizing the tort.
The second was rejecting the requirement that plaintiff produce expert
testimony to establish the duty.32
C. The Breach of the Physician's Duty to Disclose
The physician breaches his duty when he fails to disclose a fact mate-
rial to the exercise of the patient's power either to consent to or veto a
proposed medical procedure. Labeling this duty to disclose information
as "informed consent" has led to confusion. 33 Although the term sug-
27. Id. at 281, 522 P.2d at 859.
28. Id. at 283, 522 P.2d at 860-61 (quoting with approval Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243.
502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972)).
29. Id. at 290, 522 P.2d at 865. Interestingly, the court found that neither the jury instruction
proposed by plaintiff nor the one given by the trial court required the jury to measure the duty to
inform by a standard established by expert testimony. Id. at 290 n. 1I, 522 P.2d at 864-65 n. 11.
Apparently the trial court instruction was erroneous due to developments in the law subsequent to the
trial. See Brief for Appellant 30-32, Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wn. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974).
Miller, I I Wn. App. at 290, 522 P.2d at 865 (holding).
30. "Once it has been established by expert medical testimony that a risk existed .. . it is not
for the medical profession to establish a criteria [sic] for the dissemination of information to the
patient based upon what doctors feel the patient should be told." Miller. II Wn. App. at 285-86.
522 P.2d at 862.
31. The supreme court opinion stated: "We can add nothing constructive to the well considered
opinion of [the] court [of appeals] and, accordingly, approve and adopt the reasoning thereof."
Miller v. Kennedy, 85 Wn. 2d 152, 530 P.2d 334 (1975).
32. Expert medical testimony generally remains mandatory for plaintiff to recover, however. See
note 16 supra.
33. The informed consent label has been called "an obvious misnomer." ZeBarth, 81 Wn. 2d at
23, 499 P.2d at 8.
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gests both informational and consensual elements, the consent component
has received scant attention from either courts or commentators. 34 In-
stead, the emphasis has been on the information the physician either with-
held or disclosed, with relatively little scrutiny of the patient's subjective
comprehension of that information. Thus, the tort is better understood
when defined in terms of the physician's duty to disclose material facts.
The Washington cases have all involved what may be termed a sub-
stantive breach of the duty to disclose. 35 The physician either withheld
information material to the exercise of the patient's power to decide, 36 or
the undisclosed information was found immaterial. 37 Whether the physi-
cian has breached his duty to disclose, therefore, turns almost exclusively
on whether any undisclosed information was "material" to the patient's
exercise of his power of choice. The rapid expansion of Washington's
view of materiality in this context is the focus of Part II.
D. Proximate Cause-The Requirement of Altered Conduct
A successful suit under informed consent theory requires some causal
connection between the undisclosed material fact and the injury to the
patient. 38 The mere fact that an undisclosed risk materialized has gener-
ally been found insufficient to establish causation unless the informed pa-
tient would have avoided the injury by foregoing the treatment. 39 If dis-
closure would not have altered the patient's conduct and thus preented
the injury, then there is no causation. The role of proximate cause in the
doctrine of informed consent, therefore, is to insure that recovery cannot
be obtained for injuries unconnected to the physician's breach of his duty
to disclose.40 Washington's expanded scope of required disclosure, how-
34. Waltz& Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. L. REv. 628,643-46 (1969).
35. No Washington case has considered the possibility of a procedural breach of the duty to
disclose. Such a breach would occur if the physician disclosed information in terms incomprehensible
to the layman. Although the potential for a pro-plaintiff shift based upon a procedural breach of the
physician's duty to disclose information exists, no such shift has occurred. See generally WASH. REv.
CODE § 7.70.060(1) (1979) (description of material facts in written consent form must be in language
the patient could reasonably be expected to understand).
36. See, e.g., Hunter v. Brown, 81 Wn. 2d 465, 468, 502 P.2d 1194, 1196 (1972) (need for
disclosure of only a 50% chance of success in, a dermabrasion procedure held too clear to require
expert testimony).
37. See, e.g., Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wn. App. 298, 313-14, 474 P.2d 909, 919-20 (1970)
(.75% risk of perforation of the esophagus in an esophagoscopy held not a reasonably foreseeable
risk, therefore no duty to disclose).
38. Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 34, at 646.
39. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
40. "An unrevealed risk that should have been made known must materialize, for otherwise the
omission, however unpardonable, is legally without consequence. Occurrence of the risk must be
harmful to the patient, for negligence unrelated to injury is nonactionable." Id. (footnote omitted).
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ever, may allow recovery for failing to disclose facts that are tenuously
connected with the reasonable patient's choice to forego treatment and
thus avoid injury. 4 1
Altered conduct has generally been the test for establishing causation.
Traditionally, the more difficult question has been whether an objective
or subjective standard should be used to decide whether the patient would
have consented if he had been given all the material facts. 42 Under an
objective test, the jury must decide whether the reasonable person, if
apprised of the undisclosed information, would have consented to the
proposed medical procedure. 43 A subjective test, on the other hand, re-
quires that the jury decide whether this particular patient would have con-
sented to the proposed treatment if fully informed. 44
The analysis favoring an objective standard was elucidated best in Can-
terbury v. Spence,45 a federal circuit court of appeals decision. The Can-
terbury court reasoned that the causal link was present when, and only
when, disclosure of the withheld information would have resulted in a
decision by the reasonably prudent patient to forego the proposed treat-
ment. 46 The court rejected a subjective test because that test focuses on
the injured patient's response to the hypothetical question: "Would you
have consented if apprised of all the facts?" The subjective test puts the
physician at the mercy of the patient's hindsight and bitterness. 47 Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that an objective test would ease fact-finding
and better assure "truth as its product." 48 Washington explicitly adopted
the objective test in Miller v. Kennedy.49
The objective test of causation is inconsistent with the rationale of pa-
tient sovereignty because it deprives the patient of some portion of his
decisional power.50 True sovereignty over his own body 5' would allow a
41. See Part 11-B infra.
42. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
43. Id.
44. See Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676, 690 (1972).
45. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). The injury to plaintiff in
Canterbury was paralysis, allegedly resulting from exploratory surgery to determine the nature of
plaintiff's back discomforts. Testimony indicated that the procedure, a laminectomy, presented a
statistical risk of a 1% chance of paralysis. Id. at 778. At issue was the propriety of a directed verdict
in favor of the defendant-physician. The court found the directed verdict improper, deciding that
whether the physician should have disclosed the risk of paralysis to the patient was a question for the
jury. Id. at 795.
46. Id. at 790-91. Accord. Holt v. Nelson, I I Wn. App. 230,236,523 P.2d 211, 216 (1974).
47. 464F.2dat790-91.
48. Id. at 791. After an injury has occurred, the physician is also subject to the plaintiff-patient's
self interest regarding anticipated recovery in a lawsuit.
49. 11 Wn. App. at 289-90,522 P.2d at 864.
50. Katz, supra note 8, at 163-64.
51. See notes 7 and 28 supra (a patient has the "right" to make the ultimate decision). See also
Canterbury. 464 F.2d at 780.
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patient to veto a proposed course of treatment even if his veto was based
on an unreasonable factor; therefore, if disclosure would have prompted
an unreasonable decsion to veto treatment, the failure to disclose could
still be viewed as an actionable wrong. 52
Nonetheless, in R.C.W. § 7.70.050, the Washington legislature
adopted the Miller and Canterbury objective test for causation in in-
formed consent actions. An element of plaintiff's suit is proof that a rea-
sonably prudent person in the patient's circumstances would not have
consented to the treatment if informed of the omitted material facts.53
In terms of the sovereignty continuum, the issue of proximate cause
represents plaintiff's most difficult doctrinal hurdle. The test for causa-
tion, while virtually ignored in Washington's early cases, 54 coalesced in a
pro-defendant form and remains so.
II. THE EXPANDED SCOPE OF MATERIAL FACTS THAT
THE PHYSICIAN MUST DISCLOSE
A. Material Facts: From Whose Perspective?
While the case law has suggested that the physician is required to make
"full" 55 or "complete" 56 disclosure, he is actually required to disclose
much less. In Washington, the physician has a duty to disclose facts
material 57 to the exercise of the patient's power of choice. The issue then
becomes from whose perspective materiality is defined.
Determining materiality from the physician's perspective is illustrated
by ZeBarth.58 The ZeBarth court found a fact material if a reasonable
physician would disclose that fact to his patient. 59 The court applied the
traditional malpractice requirement that the plaintiff establish, by expert
medical testimony, a departure from medical custom. Thus, the duty to
52. See Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, In-
formed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 691 (1975).
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050(l)(c) (1979).
54. For example, the jury instruction approved in ZeBarth omitted any mention of proof of al-
tered conduct. It merely stated: "If therapy is administered without valid consent, it renders those
responsible for such administration liable for any damages proximately resulting therefrom." Ze-
Barth, 81 Wn. 2d at 22-23 n.4, 499 P.2d at 8 n.4.
55. -[I]n discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed consis-
tent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent." Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr.
Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957) (emphasis added).
56. "If . . . the patient inquires concerning any or all risks, then complete disclosure on the
part of the physician is required." Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wn. App. 298, 313, 474 P.2d 909, 919
(1970) (emphasis added).
57. "The doctor has a duty to disclose the material risks as a matter of law." Miller. 11 Wn.
App. at 284-85,522 P.2d at 862 (footnote omitted).
58. See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
59. ZeBarth, 81 Wn. 2d at 29,499 P.2d at 11.
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inform, the proof of the duty, and the scope of the duty were all governed
by the standard of the medical profession.
Materiality from the patient's perspective was first enunciated in Can-
terbury60 and later adopted by the Washington courts. 61 The Canterbury
court reasoned that a physician's performance could be evaluated by ei-
ther a special (i.e., medical) or general (i.e., reasonable person) standard,
depending on whether expert medical judgment was required. The physi-
cian would be presumed to be governed by the general standard unless the
special standard was triggered by the exercise of expert judgment. 62 Since
the physician initially possesses the medical information, he must deter-
mine the scope of disclosure. 63 The Canterbury court, however, did not
believe that this initial decision required expert judgment. They con-
cluded that in this setting the physician was to be judged by the general
standard of reasonableness. 64 The court determined that the patient's
"right" to decide demanded that the scope of disclosure be defined by the
patient's need for the information. 65
This "need to know" also formed the basis of the Miller court's for-
mulation of the scope of disclosure. The Miller test was: "Would the
patient as a human being consider this item in choosing his or her course
of treatment?" 66 The failure of the Miller court to restrict the patient's
informational needs to reasonable limits was rectified by R.C.W. §
7.70.050, which renders a fact material "if a reasonably prudent person
in the position of the patient or his representative would attach signifi-
cance to it [in] deciding whether or not to submit to the proposed treat-
ment. "67 This test is consistent with the objective test of causation; it also
circumscribes the patient's power to choose. 68
60. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). It is difficult to overstate the impact of the Canterbi'ry deci-
sion on Washington law. Much of the current doctrine, on this and other issues, is traceable to Can-
terbury.
61. Miller, 11 Wn. App. at 285-88, 522 P.2d at 862-64.
62. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 785.
63. Id. at 787. Under the Canterbury court's reasoning, it is possible to argue that the physician
generally should be evaluated by a special, medical standard, established by expert testimony. In
discussing the scope of disclosure required of the physician, the court stated: "[The physician] cannot
know with complete exactitude what the patient would consider important to his decision, but on the
basis of his medical training and experience he can sense how the average, reasonable patient expect-
ably would react [in deciding what information he should disclose to his patient]." Id. (footnote
omitted). Since this initial decision involves expert judgment, arguably the application of the special.
medical standard should have been triggered.
64. "Whenever nondisclosure of particular risk information is open to debate by reasonable-
minded men, the issue is for the finder of the facts." Id. at 788.
65. Id. at 786-87.
66. Miller, I l Wn. App. at 282-83,522 P.2d at 860.
67. WASH. REv. COnE § 7.70.050(2) (1979).
68. See notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra.
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B. The Elements of Material Facts
Currently in Washington, the physician's duty to disclose material
facts is comprised of three elements. First, the physician has a duty to
disclose material risks inherent in a proposed treatment. Second, the phy-
sician has a duty to disclose alternative courses of treatment, including no
action, and their attendant risks. Third, the physician has a duty to dis-
close the existence of a potentially dangerous physical abnormality and
the diagnostic steps, including tests, available to ascertain the signifi-
cance of that abnormality.
1. Risk disclosure
The severity and probability of risks in a proposed medical procedure
are the clearest examples of material facts that the physician must dis-
close. The nexus between risk disclosure and the effective exercise of the
patient's power of choice provided both the rationale and the initial im-
petus for the development of the doctrine. Washington's early cases are
couched in risk disclosure language. 69 Since the reasonable patient would
want to know the dangers inherent in any medical procedure, early cases
justified the informed consent doctrine as protecting the patient from suf-
fering the consequences of encountering unknown risks. 70
Hunter v. Brown71 provides an excellent illustration. The physician
failed to disclose both that the treatment's probability of success was only
fifty percent and that the risk of aggravating the plaintiff's condition was
greater for persons of the patient's racial group. 72 The Washington Su-
preme Court held that the need for disclosure was so obvious that expert
testimony was unnecessary. 73
On the issue of proximate cause, therefore, a risk disclosure fact pat-
69. E.g., Hunter v. Brown, 81 Wn. 2d 465, 502 P.2d 1194 (1972) (need for disclosure of 50%
risk of failure in dermabrasion procedure held too obvious to require expert medical testimony); Ma-
son v. Ellsworth, 3 Wn. App. 298,474 P.2d 909 (1970) (.75% risk of perforation of the esophagus in
an esophagoscopy held not foreseeable).
70. "[The very purpose of the disclosure rule is to protect the patient against the consequences
which, if known, he would have avoided by foregoing the treatment." Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790
(footnote omitted).
71. 81 Wn. 2d 465, 502 P.2d 1194 (1972). The issue was whether the trial court erred in granting
defendant-physician's motion for a directed verdict based on plaintiff's failure to introduce evidence
of a medical standard of disclosure. Id. at 467, 502 P.2d at 1196.
72. Plaintiff, an Oriental woman, consulted defendant-physician regarding hyperpigmentation
and facial scars. The physician recommended dermabrasion, a process akin to sandpapering the skin.
After a painful and embarrassing recovery period, plaintiff's condition became worse. Id. at 466, 502
P.2d at 1195.
73. Id. at 468, 502 P.2d at 1196. The decision was pre-Miller. See notes 26-32 and accompany-
ing text supra, for a discussion of the requirement of expert medical testimony in informed consent
actions in Washington.
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tern involves only one "link" in the causal chain. The reasonable patient
would not have consented to the treatment, and thus would have avoided
injury, if apprised of the undisclosed risk.
2. Alternative disclosure
In one sense, only a minimal expansion of the disclosure duty is re-
quired to include feasible, alternative medical procedures. A meaningful
exercise of a power of choice certainly envisions consideration of alterna-
tives. The expansive nature of imposing on the physician a duty to dis-
close alternatives, however, is apparent for two reasons. First, due to the
patient-oriented standard of materiality, 74 the physician is under a duty to
disclose alternative treatments or tests that the physician may regard as
unacceptable and may be unwilling to administer. Second, the disclosure
of alternatives adds another potential link in the causal chain.
The duty to disclose alternatives that the physician regards as undesir-
able for the patient was established in Archer v. Galbraith.75 The injury
occurred incident to the removal of a portion of plaintiff's thyroid gland
due to the presence of a "cold nodule," which had malignant tenden-
cies. 76 Evidence indicated that the course of treatment undertaken was
medically preferred, although alternatives with substantially greater risks
were available. 77 Plaintiff's physicians both testified that they regarded
surgery as the only proper course of treatment for the plaintiff's condi-
tion.78 The court held that it was for the jury to decide the feasibility of
the alternatives. 79 Despite testimony indicating that the course of treat-
ment followed was the prudent one, the court decided that an opportunity
to choose an alternative treatment should have been given to the patient. 80
The second expansive aspect of alternative disclosure relates to causa-
74. See Part I-A supra.
75. 18 Wn. App. 369, 567 P.2d 1155 (1977). At issue was the propriety of two trial court in-
structions given prior to a jury verdict for defendant-physician. The first instruction withdrew from
the jury's consideration plaintiff's claim that the physician failed to disclose an alternative method of
treatment. The second instruction described the physician's duty of disclosure in terms substantially
identical to plaintiff's proposed instruction, but omitted any mention of a duty to disclose alternative
courses of treatment. Id. at 374-76, 567 P.2d at 1159-60.
76. Id. at 370, 567 P.2d at 1157. As a result of the operation, plaintiff's voice was reduced to a
hoarse whisper and she experienced difficulty swallowing liquids and regaining her breath after exer-
tion. Id. at 370-71, 567 P.2d at 1157.
77. Both a needle biopsy and observation coupled with drug therapy were available options. If
the cold nodule had proved malignant, either option would have been dangerous for the patient. Id. at
372-74, 567 P.2d at 1157-59.
78. Id. at 371,373-74,567 P.2d at 1157, 1158.
79. Id. at 379, 567 P.2d at 1161.
80. "While it may be that the testimony as a whole indicated that the prudent course of action
was to remove the nodule surgically, this decision was not a decision to be made by the physician but
by the patient." Id. at 378, 567 P.2d at 1161 .
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tion. In Holt v. Nelson,81 the issue was the propriety of the trial court's
granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial after a jury verdict for defen-
dant-physician. Plaintiff's motion was prompted by the failure of the trial
court to give plaintiff's requested jury instruction on informed consent.82
The appellate court upheld the decision to grant a new trial for plaintiff on
all issues.83 The court reasoned that the omitted portion of plaintiff's jury
instruction 84 adequately stated plaintiff's claim: if the alternative of a cae-
sarean delivery and the comparative risks between a vaginal and a cae-
sarean delivery had been disclosed, then the plaintiff would have elected
the alternative treatment and thus avoided injury to her child. 85
As Holt indicates, requiring alternative disclosure may add another link
in the causal chain. If the alternative of no treatment is unavailable, then
the patient must prove more than that she, or the reasonable person,
would not have consented to the proposed treatment if fully informed.
Under the Holt fact pattern, two correct choices by the patient must be
proven prior to concluding that the failure to disclose the information
caused the injury to the child. First, the plaintiff must prove that a fully
informed reasonable patient would have vetoed the proposed delivery
procedure. Second, the plaintiff must prove that the reasonable patient
would have chosen the "proper" delivery procedure. 86 Only then may
the undisclosed information be said to have caused the injury to the child.
3. Abnormality disclosure
In the recent case of Gates v. Jensen,87 the Washington Supreme Court
added a third element, abnormality disclosure, 88 to the scope of material
81. 11 Wn. App. 230, 523 P.2d 211 (1974). In Holt, an expectant mother experienced painless
bleeding five weeks before the expected birth. The symptoms indicated placenta previa, which was
confirmed seven weeks later. At that point the physician attempted to induce labor, but was unsuc-
cessful. After signs of poor fetal heart tones, a caesarean section was commenced. The child was
born a spastic quadriplegic. Id. at 231-32, 523 P.2d at 214.
82. Id. at232,523 P.2dat214.
83. Id. at243-44, 523 P.2d at220.
84. The omitted portion of plaintiff's instruction was somewhat cryptic concerning the issue of
informed consent. It stated: "In failing to obtain the informed consent of the parents in electing to
induce labor and attempt a vaginal delivery in the face of circumstances making a Caesarean Section
the proper alternative." Id. at 233, 523 P.2d at 215. The court held that the instruction would have
properly presented the issue of informed consent to the jury. Id. at 242, 523 P.2d at 219.
85. Id. at 242, 523 P.2d at 219. Note that the court implicitly adopted the subjective test of
causation in characterizing plaintiff's claim.
86. Note the implicit assumption that a physician could have been found who would have con-
sented to administer the "proper" medical alternative. See note 10 supra.
87. 92 Wn. 2d 246,595 P.2d 919 (1979).
88. The expansion of material facts which the physician must disclose to include physical abnor-
malities-and, more importantly, the steps available to determine the significance of those abnormal-
ities-largely prompted this comment. Consequently, Gates is discussed at some length.
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facts that the physician must disclose. Two criticisms may be advanced
against the expansion of materiality to include abnormalities. First, the
court indicated that their new rule had already been established. By way
of precedent, however, the court relied solely on an unjustified dictum in
Miller, which in turn was supported only by a narrower dictum in Canter-
bury.89 Second, abnormality disclosure extends the causal chain too far,
allowing recovery for failure to disclose facts that, if disclosed, would be
unlikely to prevent injury to the plaintiff.90
In Gates, the issue was "whether the doctrine of informed consent re-
quires a physician to inform a patient of a bodily abnormality discovered
during a routine examination and of diagnostic procedures which may be
taken to determine the significance of that abnormality."9 1 Plaintiff had
consulted defendant-ophthalmologist complaining of blurring and of gaps
in her vision. The physician administered the mandatory 92 eye pressure
test for glaucoma, and obtained a borderline test reading that he did not
disclose to the patient. 93 The physician then examined plaintiff's eyes and
made a diagnosis that plaintiff did not have glaucoma. 94 He failed to dis-
close, however, that plaintiff's age and eye condition indicated a higher
risk of glaucoma and that two additional "simple, inexpensive, and risk
free" 95 tests existed to determine the significance of the initial borderline
89. See notes 102-04 and accompanying text infra.
90. A third criticism, the prospect of altering the rule against patient recovery for a physician's
failure to diagnose or a mistaken diagnosis, is discussed in Part Ill-A infra.
91. 92 Wn. 2d at 247, 595 P.2d at 921 (emphasis added).
92. In Helling v. Carey, 83 Wn. 2d 514, 514 P.2d 981 (1974), the Washington Supreme Court
found defendant-ophthalmologist negligent as a matter of law for failing to administer the same pres-
sure test.
93. When the patient in Gates inquired about the pressure test, which involved placing a metal
instrument directly on the eye, the physician informed her that everything was line, that lie had
checked for glaucoma and that she was altogether "too young." Brief for Appellants at 6. Gates v.
Jensen, 20 Wn. App. 81, 579 P.2d 374 (1978), rev'd, 92 Wn. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979). Actu-
ally, plaintiff was 54 years old and severely myopic, which doubled her chances of getting glaucoma.
92 Wn. 2d at 247, 595 P.2d at 921.
94. The jury initially found that the defendant had made a non-negligent diagnosis. They were
given an instruction stating: "An ophthalmologist has a duty to perform whatever diagnostic pro-
cedures are necessary, according to the standards of his specialty, and to inform himself as to the
facts or circumstances indicating the presence or absence of eye disease in his patient." Gates v.
Jensen, 20 Wn. App. 81, 87, 579 P.2d 374, 377-78. The Washington Supreme Court reversed for
failure to give an instruction that reasonable prudence might require a standard higher than that prac-
ticed by reasonable ophthalmologists. 92 Wn. 2d at 251-54, 595 P.2d at 923-24.
95. These additional tests were dilating the patient's eyes (to gain a better view of the optic nerve
discs) and a visual field exam (to determine loss in field of vision). Gates, 92 Wn. 2d at 248. 595
P.2d at 92 1.
"Risk free" was the Gates court's characterization. Id. Cf. Helling v. Carey. 83 Wn. 2d 514. 519
P.2d 981 (1974) (court characterized the same pressure test given to the patient in Gates as "simple"
and "inexpensive," with no judgment factor involved, and concluded that administering the test
would "no doubt" reveal the evidence of glaucoma. Id. at 518, 519 P.2d at 983).
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reading. Two years later, after repeated96 visits to the defendant-clinic,
plaintiff was functionally blind. 97
Conflicting evidence was offered on whether the standards of ophthal-
mologists required administration of the additional tests. 98 The supreme
court held that it was for the jury to decide whether the reasonably pru-
dent person would regard the borderline test reading, the increased statis-
tical risk of glaucoma, and the alternative diagnostic tests as facts mate-
rial to the plaintiffs choice of a diagnostic procedure. 99 The court stated
that the physician's duty of disclosure arises as soon as he is aware of an
abnormality which might indicate danger to the patient. 100 The court rea-
soned that to require less would be to deprive the patient of her power of
choice.101
Gates is significant for several reasons. First, the duty to disclose arises
when the physician encounters an abnormality. Second, a physician's
duty to disclose may arise before he has made a diagnosis or has recom-
mended a course of treatment. Third, tests that might lead to the discov-
ery of disease are deemed material facts. Fourth, it is no defense that the
physician has taken steps within the standard of his profession to satisfy
himself that his patient suffers from no disease.
Gates' requirement of abnormality disclosure is subject to criticism be-
cause it elevated to a holding a dictum in Miller, which itself had broad-
ened considerably a prior dictum in Canterbury. The Canterbury court
had stated that a physician, if the exigencies of due care demanded, might
be required to alert the patient to an abnormal condition. 10 2 Miller meta-
morphosed this statement into a flat contention that due care demanded
disclosure of abnormalities. 10 3 Gates cited Miller as holding that a physi-
cian has a fiduciary duty to inform a patient of all abnormalities encoun-
96. Plaintiff revisited the defendant-clinic 12 times. 92 Wn. 2d at 248, 595 P.2d at 921.
97. Id. at 249,595 P.2d at 922.
98. Compare the differing statements of the experts who testified at trial concerning the standard
of the profession regarding dilating the patient's eyes when viewing the discs to see if they exhibit the
exacerbated "cupping" characteristic of glaucoma. Brief for Appellant at 21-35, Gates v. Jensen,
20 Wn. App. 81,579 P.2d 374 (1978), rev'd, 92 Wn. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979).
Defendants maintained that plaintiff's vision loss was attributable to a stroke, or series of strokes,
termed ischemic optic neuropathy (ION). ION cannot be diagnosed or anticipated. See Brief for
Respondents at 10-16, Gates v. Jensen, 20 Wn. App. 81, 579 P.2d 374 (1978), rev'd, 92 Wn. 2d
246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979). See also Brief for Respondents at 7-9, Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wn. 2d 246,
595 P.2d 919 (1979).
99. 92 Wn. 2d at 250-51,595 P.2d at 923.
100. Id. at 251,595 P.2d at 923.
101. Id.
102. "Due care may require a physician perceiving symptoms of bodily abnormality to alert the
patient to the condition." 464 F.2d at 781 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
103. "Due care requires the physician to alert the patient to abnormalities in his body." I 1 Wn.
App. at 282, 522 P.2d at 860, citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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tered. 10 4 This development makes it unclear whether the Gates court
wanted to establish the rule requiring disclosure of abnormalities or
merely compensate a sympathetic plaintiff.
Second, Gates failed to consider fully the requirement of altered con-
duct as proof of causation. The causal chain must be extended signifi-
cantly under Gates to establish the required proof that the plaintiff would
not have been injured but for the defendant's failure to disclose. The
plaintiff in Gates must prove that: (1) if the physician would have dis-
closed the abnormality and the alternative diagnostic tests; (2) if the pa-
tient would have vetoed the physician's proposed test and consented to
the alternative tests; (3) if the physician would have consented to adminis-
ter the alternative tests; (4) if those tests would have indicated glaucoma;
and (5) if the condition would have been treated successfully, then the
patient would have avoided the injury. 105 At some point, the causal con-
nection between the breach of the duty to disclose and the resulting injury
becomes too speculative. The causal connection in Gates approaches, if
not exceeds, the limit to which the law should extend its protection.
III. IMPLICATIONS
The doctrine of informed consent in Washington has undergone a
marked pro-plaintiff shift since the physician's duty to disclose informa-
tion was first recognized in 1970. Specifically, the physician is now re-
sponsible for disclosing abnormalities he discovers regardless of the steps
he takes to ascertain the significance of those abnormalities and regardless
of whether these steps are in full compliance with the standards of his
104. "[Miller] held that a physician has a fiduciary duty to inform a patient of abnormalities in
his or her body." 92 Wn. 2d at 250, 595 P.2d at 922, citing Miller v. Kennedy, I I Wn. App. 272.
282, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), aff'd, 85 Wn. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975).
Furthermore, the court cited Betesch v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1974). for the
proposition that the duty of disclosure arises whenever the physician becomes aware of an abnor-
mality. Betesch concemed the failure of physicians conducting a pre-induction physicial examination
to inform a potential inductee that he was rejected from the armed forces on the basis of an abnormal
x-ray. By the time plaintiff leamed of the existence of the tumor which the x-ray evidenced, the
disease had progressed to the incurable stage. While informed consent theories were not discussed,
the district court held that the physicians under contract to the United States failed to exercise the
care, skill, and diligence generally exercised by physicians in the locality. Id. at 247. The Betesch
court was evaluating the physician's performance by a different standard. In that case a standard of
disclosure did exist and the physicians fell below it.
In postulating a similar situation, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated: "Failure to disclose a risk
that would have been disclosed under accepted medical practice thus should be a sufficient, but not a
necessary, condition of [informed consent] liability." Comfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 702
(Minn. 1977).
105. It was not clear that the plaintiff's glaucomatous condition at the time of trial had, in fact.
been the cause of her injury. See note 98 supra.
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medical specialty. 10 6 The pro-plaintiff shift in the doctrine of informed
consent has two significant implications. The most serious is the possibil-
ity that informed consent doctrine will supplant traditional malpractice
doctrine. In particular, informed consent doctrine represents a vehicle for
altering the rule against recovery for a non-negligent mistaken diagno-
sis107 or a non-negligent failure to diagnose. 108 This potential alteration
represents a major shift in the decisional balance between physicians and
their patients struck by traditional tort law. Second, whether or not this
alteration materializes, previous pro-plaintiff shifts in the doctrine are
likely to encourage physicians to adopt overly defensive postures to pro-
tect themselves from liability, resulting in a misallocation of medical re-
sources.
A. Overlap with Traditional Malpractice Doctrine-Recovery for Mis-
taken Diagnosis?
In the malpractice area, Washington adheres to the position that the
physician does not insure the return to health of his patient. 109 A bad re-
sult, standing alone, does not create an inference of fault. 110 The inexact
nature of medical science and human fallibility make the prospect of er-
rors in diagnosis or a failure to diagnose inevitable. I"' If the physician
exercises the skill and judgment of a member in good standing within his
profession, these mistakes have been held nonactionable. 112
The case of Keogan v. Holy Family Hospital' 13 illustrates the potential
of the informed consent doctrine to alter these rules. Plaintiff's theory
was that defendant-physician had a duty to disclose the existence of alter-
106. See Part II-B-3 supra.
107. See notes 109-12 and accompanying text infra.
108. Id.
109. Miller, 11 Wn. App. at 280, 522 P.2d at 859.
110. See Teig v. St. John's Hosp., 63 Wn. 2d 369, 375, 387 P.2d 527, 531 (1963).
Ill. -[Medicine] is not an exact science, and even the very best of [doctors] can be wrong in
diagnosis or procedure. The question, however, is not whether a physician has made a mistake;
rather, the question is whether he was negligent." Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256 N.W.2d
379, 385 (1977), quoting Francois v. Mokrohisky, 67 Wis. 2d 196, 226 N.W.2d 470, 472 (1975).
112. E.g., Crouch v. Wyckoff, 6 Wn. 2d 273, 282-83, 107 P.2d 339,343 (1940).
113. 22 Wn. App. 366, 589 P.2d 310 [hereinafter cited as Keogan 1], affrd on rehearing, 24
Wn. App. 583, 601 P.2d 1303 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Keogan II], petition for review granted, 93
Wn. 2d 1006, 612 P.2d - (1980).
In Keogan, a 37-year-old attorney consulted the physician complaining of chest pains. He was
given a resting electrocardiogram and a cardiac enzyme test. The results of the cardiac enzyme test
were "slightly abnormal." Keogan 1, 22 Wn. App. at 367, 589 P.2d at 312. These tests were re-
peated during a second visit a short time later. A week after this second visit the attorney died of a
heart attack. Id. at 367-68, 589 P.2d at 311-12. The issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred
in refusing to give plaintiff's requested jury instruction on informed consent. Id. at 367, 589 P.2d at
311.
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native diagnostic tests."l 4 The court of appeals held that the duty to in-
form had not yet arisen, because the physician had not recommended a
diagnostic or treatment procedure presenting a risk to the decedent. 115
Keogan is in clear conflict with the holding in Gates. Under Gates, the
duty to disclose material alternatives arises as soon as the physician is
aware of an abnormality. 116 Undisclosed alternative tests existed in Keo-
gan, and reasonable minds might differ on whether knowledge of these
tests was material to the exercise of the patient's power to consent to the
tests that were given.
The court of appeals reconsidered their decision in Keogan after Gates
was decided, 117 and again concluded that the physician's duty to disclose
had not yet arisen. 118 The court distinguished Gates on its facts, citing the
simple, risk free nature of the alternative tests in Gates and the relative
ease of diagnosing glaucoma in comparison with heart disease. 119
It is possible to reconcile Keogan with Gates and reach the same result
as the court of appeals. Applying the Gates reasoning, the physician in
Keogan had a duty to disclose the steps available to ascertain the signifi-
cance of the patient's symptoms and the cardiac enzyme test results as
soon as he became aware of these abnormalities. The existence of alterna-
tive diagnostic tests is material to the decision whether to consent to those
tests that were given. Consequently, the failure to disclose the existence
of those tests was a breach of the physician's duty. To conclude, how-
ever, that this breach of duty caused the heart attack and death of the
patient is highly problematic. The choice of an alternative test by the de-
cedent, the diagnosis of heart trouble, the amenability of the problem dis-
covered to treatment, and the subsequent avoidance of injury represent a
highly attenuated line of causation.
Characterizing the events which led to the plaintiff's death as a breach
of the physician's duty to disclose material facts clouds the basis of the
claim: a failure to diagnose heart trouble. The rationale supporting the
rule against recovery for a non-negligent failure to diagnose continues to
be valid. A physician cannot diagnose every disease and cannot cure ev-
ery disease diagnosed. 120 If the rule is to be maintained, then a decision,
114. The specific tests that the plaintiff alleged should have been disclosed were nitroglycerin, a
stress (treadmill) EKG, and an angiogram. Keogan 1, 22 Wn. App. at 370, 589 P.2d at 313.
115. Id.at370,589P.2dat312.
116. In Keogan, the abnormality triggering the disclosure duty was the chest pain that the plain-
tiff reported to the physician during his first visit. Id. at 368, 589 P.2d at 311-12. Alternatively, the
"'slightly abnormal" cardiac enzyme test results might trigger the duty to disclose the procedures
available to ascertain the significance of that abnormality. Id. at 368-70, 589 P.2d at 311-13.
117. Keogan H,24Wn.App.583,601 P.2d 1303.
118. Id. at 584-85, 601 P.2d at 1304.
119. Id. at 584-86, 601 P.2d at 1304-05.
120. See note I ll supra.
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as a matter of law, that the failure to disclose the existence of diagnostic
tests did not cause the injury is warranted. A contrary result presumes that
the patient, in the exercise of his power of choice, can correct the reason-
able errors of his physician. This assumption is faulty. Holding a physi-
cian liable for a reasonable failure to diagnose is to adopt this faulty as-
sumption and to abandon the negligence standard. 121 The inexact nature
of medical science will remain no matter whom the law regards as the
sovereign decision maker. As long as duty is defined in terms of behavior
imposed by law, the physician ought not be held responsible for an injury
which adherence to the standard of behavior imposed is unlikely to pre-
vent.
B. Misallocation of Medical Resources
The overall pro-plaintiff shift in the informed consent doctrine is a
clear message from the courts to physicians to alter their professional dis-
closure practices. Whether this message is heeded or not, certain effects
on professional conduct may be anticipated. Encouragement of defensive
medicine 122 and an expanded role for written consent forms seem likely.
Commentators have speculated about a trend toward defensive medi-
cine in connection with the malpractice "crisis" generally. 123 This trend,
if it exists, can only be exacerbated by the growth of informed consent
along its current lines. The spectre of liability for a failure to diagnose
may tempt the physician to adopt excessively defensive practices. The
use of duplicative tests, for example, is a direct outgrowth of the denigra-
tion of expert medical judgment. The physician is not encouraged to rely
on his best judgment if his non-negligent decision, should he err, will not
be a defense in a lawsuit.
Physicians may seek to avail themselves of the procedural advantages
afforded by written patient consent forms. 124 If such a form is procured,
121. One commentator has argued persuasively that informed consent is merely a stepping stone
to strict liability in medicine. Meisel, The Expansion ofLiabilityfor Medical Accidents: From Negli-
gence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REv. 51, 57-58 (1977).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently refused to adopt a strict liability standard for the delivery
of medical services, stating that "the consequences . . . cannot be predicted with sufficient clarity
to permit the step to be taken." Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256 N.W.2d 379, 393 (1977).
122. "Defensive medicine [consists] of medically unjustified care provided by the physician for
the purpose of reducing the possibility of a malpractice suit ....- Project, The Medical Malprac-
tice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE L.J. 939, 942. The Project labeled this prac-
tice as "positive" defensive medicine. "Negative" defensive medicine was defined as a reluctance
to undertake activities which have a high risk of resulting in malpractice litigation. Id. at 942 n.6.
123. Id.
124. This legal advantage may be the primary incentive for physicians to procure written consent
forms. Clinical studies have concluded that written consent forms do not fulfill the purpose of pro-
moting patient participation in medical decisionmaking. See, e.g., Cassileth, Zupkis, Sulton-Smith
673
Washington Law Review
then the patient has the burden of rebutting by the preponderance of the
evidence the presumption that his consent was valid. R.C.W. § 7.70.-
060125 provides that a consent form signed by the patient or a responsible
relative will be presumed valid if it contains the following information: a
description, in layman's terms, 126 of the nature and character of the pro-
posed treatment, including its risks, possible complications, alternatives,
and expected results. According to the statute, the patient also may elect
not to be informed of anything. 127
Due to the extensive list of matters to be disclosed, and the possibility
of judicial construction sympathetic to the injured patient, preprinted
forms will suffice on rare occasions. Increased reliance on written forms
will result in an increase in the amount of time a physician spends on
"negotiating" these forms, and on additional record keeping burdens. 128
The net result of these defensive practices-additional tests and written
consent forms-is greater cost to the public for medical care and greater
demands on physicians' time. Since medical resources, particularly time,
are finite, a misallocation of medical resources is another consequence of
the pro-plaintiff shift in the informed consent doctrine.
& March, Informed Consent-Why Are its Goals Imperfectly Realized?, 302 NEw ENGLAND J. OF
MED. 896 (1980).
125. R.C.W. § 7.70.060 states that:
If a patient while legally competent, or his representative if he is not competent, signs a con-
sent form which sets forth the following, the signed consent form shall constitute prima facie
evidence that the patient gave his informed consent to the treatment administered and the patient
has the burden of rebutting this by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) A description, in language the patient could reasonably be expected to understand, of:
(a) The nature and character of the proposed treatment;
(b) The anticipated results of the proposed treatment;
(c) The recognized possible alternative forms of treatment; and
(d) The recognized serious possible risks, complications, and anticipated benefits involved in
the treatment and in the recognized possible alternative forms of treatment, including nontreat-
ment;
(2) Or as an alternative, a statement that the patient elects not to be informed of the elements
set forth in subsection (1) of this section.
Failure to use a form shall not be admissible as evidence of failure to obtain informed consent.
WASH. REv. CODE § 7.70.060 (1979).
126. The goal of comprehensible written forms may be imperfectly realized. A study of surgical
consent forms used at five medical centers in the Los Angeles area concluded that the readability of
the forms was equivalent to material intended for upper-division undergraduate or graduate students.
Grundner, On the Readability of Surgical Consent Forms, 302 NEw ENGLAND J. OF MED. 900 (1980).
See also note 35 supra.
127. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.060(2) (1979).
128. Higher administrative costs, more directly related to malpractice litigation than defensive
medicine, also affect the cost of health care. See generally Project, supra note 122. at 942-43.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The past decade in Washington has seen both the judicial adoption and
the expansion of the informed consent doctrine governing the physician-
patient relationship. The development of the doctrine is particularly nota-
ble for its pro-plaintiff shift and for its increasing overlap with traditional
medical malpractice. Most significantly, with the recent decision in Gates
v. Jensen, the Washington Supreme Court has extended the scope of
material facts that the physician must disclose to include both physical
abnormalities the physician discovers and the steps available to ascertain
the significance of those abnormalities. Imposing a duty to disclose the
existence of diagnostic tests may allow patient recovery, despite an atten-
uated line of causation, for a non-negligent mistaken diagnosis by the
physician. Furthermore, the extension of the doctrine threatens to upset
the decisional balance established by medical malpractice law between
physicians and patients, and encourages the practice of defensive medi-
cine with its attendant misallocation of medical resources.
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